Mind the gap: transitions between concepts of information in varied domains by Robinson, L. & Bawden, D.
Robinson, L. & Bawden, D. (2013). Mind the gap: transitions between concepts of information in 
varied domains. In: F. Ibekwe-SanJuan & T. M. Dousa (Eds.), Theories of Information, 
Communication and Knowledge. (pp. 121-141). Springer. ISBN 978-94-007-6973-1 
City Research Online
Original citation: Robinson, L. & Bawden, D. (2013). Mind the gap: transitions between concepts 
of information in varied domains. In: F. Ibekwe-SanJuan & T. M. Dousa (Eds.), Theories of 
Information, Communication and Knowledge. (pp. 121-141). Springer. ISBN 978-94-007-6973-1 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/6446/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
!"#$%$#$&'(&#)"&*)$+#",&#)$#&-.//&0"&1.23$/.4"%&'5/.5"
!"#$%&'()*%+& ,*-.(%"&(/#$0()'#-1*%*2-1(3&%4&&-(!2-5&$%1(26(7-62'8#%*2-(*-(9#'*&.
:28#*-1
!2$;'*<"%(=&#' >?@A
!2$;'*<"%(B2+.&' C$'*-<&'(C5*&-5&D3E1*-&11(,&.*#(3F9F
GE%"2' H#8*+;(I#8& 6'0.52'5
J#'%*5+&
/*K&-(I#8& 785
CE66*L
:*K*1*2- !&-%'&(62'(7-62'8#%*2-(C5*&-5&
M'<#-*N#%*2- !*%;(O-*K&'1*%;(P2-.2-
G..'&11 P2-.2-Q((OR
S8#*+ PFT2U*-12-V5*%;F#5FEW
!2''&1$2-.*-<(GE%"2' H#8*+;(I#8& 9$-%"5
J#'%*5+&
/*K&-(I#8& :$1.%
CE66*L
:*K*1*2- !&-%'&(62'(7-62'8#%*2-(C5*&-5&
M'<#-*N#%*2- !*%;(O-*K&'1*%;(P2-.2-
G..'&11 P2-.2-Q((OR
S8#*+ .U#4.&-V12*F5*%;F#5FEW
GU1%'#5% )"&(52-5&$%(26(X*-62'8#%*2-Y(*-(6*K&(.*66&'&-%('&#+81(Z(%&5"-2+2<*5#+Q($";1*5#+Q
U*2+2<*5#+Q(125*#+(#-.($"*+212$"*5#+(Z(*1(U'*&6+;(&L#8*-&.F()"&(X<#$1Y(U&%4&&-
%"&1&(52-5&$%*2-1(#'&(.*15E11&.Q(#-.(E-*6;*-<(6'#8&42'W1(26(.*K&'1&(-#%E'&Q
*-5+E.*-<(%"21&(26(C"#--2-[\*&-&'Q(P#-.#E&'Q(C%2-*&'Q(3#%&1(#-.(H+2'*.*Q(#'&
&L#8*-&.F()"&(K#+E&(26(#%%&8$%*-<(%2(U'*.<&(%"&(<#$1Q(4"*+&(#K2*.*-<(1"#++24
#-#+2<*&1Q(*1(&L$+#*-&.F(\*%"(*-62'8#%*2-($";1*51(<#*-*-<(<&-&'#+(#55&$%#-5&Q
#-.(U*2+2<;(<#*-*-<(%"&(1%#%E1(26(#-(*-62'8#%*2-(15*&-5&Q(*%(1&&81('#%*2-#+(%2
+22W(62'( +*-W1Q( '&+#%*2-1"*$1Q(#-#+2<*&1(#-.(&K&-("&+$6E+(8&%#$"2'1(U&%4&&-
%"&8(#-.(%"&(+*U'#';[*-62'8#%*2-(15*&-5&1F(J'21$&5%1(62'(.2*-<(12Q(*-K2+K*-<
52-5&$%1(26(528$+&L*%;(#-.(&8&'<&-5&Q(#'&(1E<<&1%&.F
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
Chapter 6 1
Mind the Gap: Transitions Between Concepts 2
of Information in Varied Domains 3
Lyn Robinson and David Bawden 4
It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of information would satisfactorily account 5
for the numerous possible applications of this general field. 6
(Claude Shannon) 7
Information is information, not matter or energy. 8
(Norbert Wiener) 9
Shannon and Wiener and I 10
Have found it confusing to try 11
To measure sagacity 12
And channel capacity 13
By
P
pi log p. 14
(Anonymous, Behavioural Science, 1962, 7(July issue), p. 395) 15
Life, language, human beings, society, culture – all owe their existence to the intrinsic ability 16
of matter and energy to process information. 17
(Seth Lloyd) 18
6.1 Introduction 19
‘Information’ is a notoriously slippery and multifaceted concept. Not only has the 20
word had many different meanings over the years – its entry in the full Oxford 21
English Dictionary of 2010, which shows its usage over time, runs to nearly 10,000 22
words – but it is used with different connotations in various domains. For overviews 23
of the mutability and diversity of the information concept, see Belkin (1978), 24
Machlup and Mansfield (1983), Qvortrup (1993), Bawden (2001), Capurro and 25
Hjørland (2003), Gleick (2011), Ma (2012), and Bawden and Robinson (2012). 26
L. Robinson • D. Bawden (!)
Centre for Information Science, City University London, London, UK
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In this chapter, we will focus on usage in different domains and disciplines. As 27
Capurro and Hjørland (2003, p. 356 and 396) say: “almost every scientific discipline 28
uses the concept of information within its own context and with regard to specific 29
phenomena : : : , There are many concepts of information, and they are embedded 30
in more or less explicit theoretical structures”. Our concern will be to examine 31
these different concepts of information, and in particular the ‘gaps’ between them. 32
By ‘gap’, we mean the discontinuities in understanding which make it difficult to 33
understand whether the ‘information’ being spoken of in different contexts is in any 34
way ‘the same thing’, or at least ‘the same sort of thing’; and if not, in what way – if 35
any – the different meanings of information relate to one another. Given the current 36
enthusiasm for ‘information physics’, exemplified by writings of Zurek, Vedral, 37
Lloyd and others cited in Sect. 6.2.2, we place particular stress on the information 38
concept in the physical sciences. We have also tried to emphasise the historical 39
perspective of these ideas. 40
We will focus particularly on the implications of these considerations for the 41
idea of information in the field of library/information science. Perhaps because 42
information is at its centre, there has been particular debate about the issue in this 43
discipline; see Belkin and Robertson (1976) for an early account and Cornelius 44
(2002), Bates (2005) and the reviews cited above, for overviews of the on-going 45
debate. A Delphi study carried out by Zins (2007) presents many definitions of 46
information for information science, typically relating information to data and/or 47
knowledge. 48
Indeed, it is the relationship between these concepts that is a constant concern, 49
perhaps even an obsession, within the information sciences. This has led to two 50
main classes of model (Bawden and Robinson 2012; Ma 2012). The first, based in 51
Karl Popper’s ‘objective epistemology’ uses ‘knowledge’ to denote Popper’s ‘World 52
2’, the subjective knowledge within an individual person’s mind. ‘Information’ is 53
used to denote communicable knowledge, recorded, or directly exchanged between 54
people; this is Popper’s ‘World 3’ of objective knowledge, necessarily encoded in 55
a ‘World ’1 document, or physical communication. Information, in this model, is 56
‘knowledge in transit’. The second regards information and knowledge as the same 57
kind of entity, with knowledge viewed as ‘refined’ information, set into some form 58
of larger structure. This is typically presented as a linear progression, or a pyramid, 59
from ‘data’, or ‘capta’ – data in which we are interested – through ‘information’ to 60
‘knowledge’, perhaps with ‘wisdom’ or ‘action’ at the far end of the spectrum or 61
the apex of the pyramid; see, for example, Checkland and Holwell (1998), Fricke´ 62
(2009), Rowley (2011), and Ma (2012). 63
The debate on the nature of information within the information sciences, some- 64
what limited in scope, has been widened by some wider visions, such as those of 65
Buckland and of Bates, which will be discussed below. The purpose of this chapter is 66
to attempt to widen perspectives still further; to attempt, in effect, to begin to answer 67
John Wheeler’s question ‘What makes meaning?’, by considering conceptions of 68
meaning-free and meaningful information, and the relations between them. 69
We begin with a brief consideration of the way in which information is viewed 70
in several diverse domains. 71
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
6 Mind the Gap: Transitions Between Concepts of Information in Varied Domains
6.2 Information in Various Domains 72
We will examine the concept of information in five domains, in each of which 73
information has come to be regarded, at least by some, as a central concept: 74
technological, physical, biological, social and philosophical. For reasons of space, 75
the discussion must be cursory, and the reader is referred for more extensive 76
treatments (at an accessible level in the case of the scientific perspective) to Gleick 77
(2011), Greene (2011), Deutsch (2011), Floridi (2010a), Davies and Gregersen 78
(2010), Vedral (2010, 2012), Lloyd (2006, 2010), von Baeyer (2004), Smolin (2000) 79
and Leff and Rex (1990, 2002). 80
6.2.1 Information and Communication Technology 81
We begin with technology rather than the sciences, since the closest approach 82
yet available to a universal formal account of information is ‘information theory’, 83
originated by Claude Shannon, and properly referred to as the Shannon-Weaver- 84
Hartley theory in recognition of those who added to it and gave it its current form. 85
Gleick (2011) gives a detailed account of these developments, which all occurred 86
in Bell Laboratories, and which focused on communication network engineering 87
issues. 88
The initial steps were taken by Harry Nyquist (1924), who showed how to 89
estimate the amount of information that could be transmitted in a channel of 90
given bandwidth – in his case, the telegraph. His ideas were developed by Ralph 91
Hartley (1928), who established a quantitative measure of information, so as to 92
compare the transmission capacities of different systems. Hartley (1928, 535) 93
emphasised that this measure was “based on physical as contrasted with psycho- 94
logical considerations”. The meaning of the messages was not to be considered; 95
information was regarded as being communicated successfully when the receiver 96
could distinguish between sets of symbols sent by the originator. His measure of 97
information, understood in this way, was the logarithm of the number of possible 98
symbol sequences. For a single selection, the associated information, H, is the 99
logarithm of the number of symbols 100
H D log s
This in turn was generalised in (1948) by Claude Shannon into a fuller theory 101
of communication, which was later republished in book form (Shannon and Weaver 102
1949). This volume included a contribution by Warren Weaver that expounded the 103
ideas in a non-mathematical and more wide-ranging manner. Weaver’s presentation 104
arguably had greater influence in promoting information theory than any of its 105
originators’ writings. 106
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Following Nyquist and Hartley, Shannon defined the fundamental problem of 107
communication as the accurate reproduction at one point of a message selected from 108
another point. Meaning was to be ignored: as Weaver noted, “these semantic aspects 109
of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem” (Shannon and Weaver 110
1949, 3). The message in each case is one selected from the set of possible messages, 111
and the system must cope with any selection. If the number of possible messages is 112
finite, then the information associated with any message is a function of the number 113
of possible messages. 114
Shannon derived his well-known formula for H, the measure of information 115
H D !K
X
pi log pi
where pi is the probability of each symbol, and K is a constant defining the units. 116
The minus sign is included to make the quantity of information, H, positive; this is 117
necessary as a probability will be a positive number less than 1, and the log of such 118
a number is negative. 119
Shannon pointed out that formulae of the general form H D !
P
pi log pi 120
appear very often in information theory as measures of information, choice, and 121
uncertainty; the three concepts seem almost synonymous for his purposes. Shannon 122
then gave the name ‘entropy’ to his quantity H, since the form of its equation was 123
that of entropy as defined in thermodynamics. It is usually said that the idea of 124
using this name was suggested to him by John von Neumann. The original source 125
for this story seems to be Myron Tribus who, citing a private discussion between 126
himself and Shannon in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on March 30th 1961, gives the 127
following account: 128
When Shannon discovered this function he was faced with the need to name it, for it 129
occurred quite often in the theory of communication he was developing. He considered 130
naming it ‘information’ but felt that this word had unfortunate popular interpretations that 131
would interfere with his intended uses of it in his new theory. He was inclined towards 132
naming it ‘uncertainty’, and discussed the matter with John Von Neumann. Von Neumann 133
suggested that the function ought to be called ‘entropy’ since it was already in use in 134
some treatises on statistical thermodynamics. Von Neumann, Shannon reports, suggested 135
that there were two good reasons for calling the function ‘entropy’. ‘It is already in use 136
under that name’, he is reported to have said, ‘and besides, it will give you a great edge in 137
debates because nobody really knows what entropy is anyway’. Shannon called his function 138
‘entropy’ and used it as a measure of ‘uncertainty’, interchanging between the two words in 139
his writings without discrimination. (Tribus 1964, p 354) 140
Whatever the truth of this, Shannon’s equating of information to entropy was 141
controversial from the first. Specialists in thermodynamics, in particular, suggested 142
that ‘uncertainty’, ‘spread’, or ‘dispersion’ were better terms, without the implica- 143
tions of ‘entropy’ (see, for example, Denbigh 1981). A particularly caustic view 144
is expressed by Mu¨ller (2007, 124, 126): “No doubt Shannon and von Neumann 145
thought that this was funny joke, but it is not – it merely exposes Shannon and von 146
Neumann as intellectual snobs : : : . If von Neumann had a problem with entropy, he 147
had no right to compound that problem for others : : : by suggesting that entropy 148
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6 Mind the Gap: Transitions Between Concepts of Information in Varied Domains
has anything to do with information : : : [Entropy] is nothing by itself. It has to 149
be seen and discussed in conjunction with temperature and heat, and energy and 150
work. And, if there is to be an extrapolation of entropy to a foreign field, it must be 151
accompanied by the appropriate extrapolations of temperature and heat and work”. 152
This reminds us that, when we see later that there have been criticisms of the use 153
of objective measures of information in the library/information sciences, these have 154
been matched by criticisms regarding the arguably uncritical use of information 155
concepts in the sciences. 156
Shannon’s was not the only attempt to derive a mathematical theory of in- 157
formation, based on ideas of probability and uncertainty. The British statistician 158
R.A. Fisher derived such a measure, as did the American mathematician Norbert 159
Wiener, the originator of cybernetics. The latter seems to have been irritated that 160
the credit for the development was given mainly to Shannon; less than 10 years 161
later, he was referring to “the Shannon-Wiener definition of quantity of information” 162
and insisting that “it belongs to the two of us equally” (Wiener 1956, 63) His 163
mathematical formalism was the same as Shannon’s but, significantly, he treated 164
information as the negative of physical entropy, associating it with structure and 165
order, the opposite of Shannon’s equating of information with entropy and disorder: 166
The notion of the amount of information attaches itself very naturally to a classical notion 167
in statistical mechanics: that of entropy. Just as the amount of information in a system is a 168
measure of its degree of organization, so the entropy of a system is a measure of its degree 169
of disorganization; and the one is simply the negative of the other (Wiener 1948, 18). 170
Shannon’s information is, in effect, the opposite of Wiener’s, which has caused 171
confusion ever since for those who seek to understand the meaning of the mathe- 172
matics, as Qvortrup (1993) makes plain. 173
In Shannon’s sense, information, like physical entropy, is associated with lack 174
of order. A set of index cards, ordered alphabetically, has low entropy, and little 175
information; if we know the order of the alphabet, we know all there is to know 176
about the ordering of the cards, and we can explain it to someone very briefly. If they 177
are disordered, however, they contain, in Shannon’s sense, much more information, 178
since we would need a much more lengthy statement to describe their arrangement. 179
By contrast, there is a long-standing idea that information should be associated 180
with order and pattern, rather than its opposite; in essence, this view follows 181
Wiener’s conception. Even Warren Weaver, arguing in support of Shannon, wrote 182
that “the concept of information developed in this theory at first seems disappointing 183
and bizarre – disappointing because it has nothing to do with meaning, and bizarre 184
: : : . in these statistical terms the two words information and uncertainty find 185
themselves to be partners” (Shannon and Weaver 1949, 116). Leon Brillouin, 186
who pioneered the introduction of Shannon’s ideas into the sciences, in effect 187
took Wiener’s stance, renaming Shannon’s entropy formulation as ‘negentropy’ 188
(Brillouin 1962). As we shall see later, Tom Stonier took the same approach, propos- 189
ing a framework for a unified understanding of information in various domains. 190
Marcia Bates (2005) noted that the idea of ‘information as pattern / organisation’ 191
was ‘endemic’ during the 1970s, and identified Parker (1974, 10) as the first to 192
state explicitly in a library/information context that “information is the pattern or 193
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organization of matter and energy”. While this concept has gained some popularity, 194
it is by no means universally accepted: Birger Hjørland (2008) speaks for those who 195
doubt it, saying that such patterns are nothing more than patterns until they inform 196
somebody about something. Reading (2011) exemplifies those who take a middle 197
course, positing that such patterns are information, but ‘meaningless information’, 198
in contrast to the ‘meaningful information’ encountered in social, and, arguably, in 199
biological, systems. 200
We now consider how these ideas were applied to bring information as an entity 201
into the physical sciences. 202
6.2.2 Information Physics 203
The idea of information as a feature of the physical world arose through studies of 204
the thermodynamic property known as entropy. Usually understood as a measure 205
of the disorder of a physical system, entropy has also come to be associated with 206
the extent of our knowledge of it; the more disordered a system, the less detailed 207
knowledge we have of where its components are, or what they are doing. This idea 208
was formalised by Zurek (1989), though it builds on earlier insights of scientists 209
such as Ludwig Boltzmann and Leo Szilard who introduced information as a 210
fundamental concept in science, though it was not named by them as such. 211
Boltzmann related the entropy of gases to their degree of disorder, measured in 212
probability terms, showing that entropy was related to the probability of collisions 213
between gas particles with different velocities. Hence it could be equated to the 214
probability distribution of the states of a system, expressed by the formula 215
S D k log W
where k is Boltzmann’s constant, and W is a measure of the number of states of a 216
system; i.e. the ways that molecules can be arranged, given a known total energy. 217
This equation is certainly reminiscent of later information theory formalisms, but – 218
although it is carved on his tombstone in the Vienna cemetery (actually using an ! 219
symbol instead of the more modern W) – Boltzmann never wrote it in this form, 220
which is due to Max Planck (Atkins 2007). To suggest, as does von Baeyer (2003, 221
98), that “by identifying entropy with missing information, Boltzmann hurled the 222
concept of information into the realm of physics” seems to be anachronistic, as well 223
as over-dramatic. 224
Szilard (1929) analysed the well-worked thermodynamic problem of ‘Maxwell’s 225
Demon’ (Leff and Rex 1990, 2002), in what was subsequently assessed as “the 226
earliest known paper in the field of information theory” (Hargatti 2006, 46), though 227
information is again not specifically mentioned. As Szilard himself later recalled: 228
: : : I wrote a little paper which was on a rather closely related subject [to a paper 229
on the second law of thermodynamics]. It dealt with the problem of what is essential 230
in the operations of the so-called Maxwell’s Demon, who guesses right and then does 231
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something, and by guessing right and doing something he can violate the second law of 232
thermodynamics. This paper was a radical departure in thinking, because I said that the 233
essential thing here is that the demon utilizes information – to be precise, information 234
which is not really in his possession until he guesses it. I said that there is a relationship 235
between information and entropy, and I computed what that relationship was. No one paid 236
any attention to this paper until, after the war, information theory became fashionable. Then 237
the paper was rediscovered. Now this old paper, to which for over 35 years nobody paid any 238
attention, is a cornerstone of modern information theory (Weart and Szilard 1978, 11). 239
True information physics began decades later when the ideas of information 240
theory were introduced into science, by pioneers such as Leon Brillouin (1962). In 241
essence, this amounted to recognising a formal mathematical link between entropy 242
and information, when information is defined in the way required by Shannon’s 243
theory (although it should be noted that it was Wiener’s interpretation that was 244
generally adopted) or, indeed, by other formalisms for defining information in 245
objective and quantitative terms, such as Fisher information (Frieden 1999), a 246
quantitative measure of information used most often in statistical analysis. 247
Subsequent analysis of the relation between information and physical entropy 248
led Landauer (1991) to propose his well-known aphorism ‘information is physical’. 249
Information must always be instantiated in some physical system; that is to say, in 250
some kind of document, in the broadest sense. Information is subject to physical 251
laws, and these laws can, in turn, be cast in information terms. The physical nature 252
of information, and, in particular, its relation to entropy, continues to arouse debate; 253
for early discussions, see Avramescu (1980) and Shaw and Davis (1983), and for 254
recent contributions, see Duncan and Semura (2007) and Karnani, Pa¨a¨kko¨nen, and 255
Annila (2009). 256
The idea of information as a fundamental physical entity has received increasing 257
attention in recent decades, inspired particularly by an association of information 258
with complexity; see Zurek (1990) for papers from a seminal meeting which 259
effectively launched this approach. Information has been proposed as a fundamental 260
aspect of the physical universe, on a par with – or even more fundamental than – 261
matter and energy. The American physicist John Wheeler is generally recognised 262
as the originator of this approach, stemming from his focus on the foundations 263
of physics, leading him to formulate what he termed his ‘Really Big Questions’, 264
such as ‘How come existence?’ and ‘Why the quantum?’. Two of his questions 265
involved information and meaning. In asking ‘It from bit?’, Wheeler queried 266
whether information was a concept playing a significant role at the foundations of 267
physics; whether it was a fundamental physical entity, equivalent to, say, energy. 268
Indeed, he divided his own intellectual career into three phases: from a starting 269
belief that ‘Everything is particles’, he moved through a view that ‘Everything is 270
fields’, to finally conclude that ‘Everything is information’, focusing on the idea 271
that logic and information form the bedrock of physical theory (MacPherson 2008). 272
In asking ‘What makes meaning?’, he invoked the idea of a ‘participatory universe’, 273
in which conscious beings may play an active role in determining the nature of the 274
physical universe. Wheeler’s views are surveyed, critiqued, and extended in papers 275
in Barrow et al. (2004). 276
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Other well-known contributors to the information physics approach are: Lee 277
Smolin (2000), who has suggested that the idea of space itself may be replaceable 278
by a ‘network of relations’ or a ‘web of information’; Seth Lloyd (2006, 2010), 279
who argues that ‘the universe computes’ (specifically in the form of a quantum 280
computer); and David Deutsch, who proposes that information flow determines the 281
nature of everything that is. “The physical world is a multiverse”, writes Deutsch 282
(2011, 304), “and its structure is determined by how information flows in it. In 283
many regions of the multiverse, information flows in quasi-autonomous streams 284
called histories, one of which we call our universe”. ‘Information flow’, in this 285
account, may be (simplistically) regarded as what changes occur in what order. 286
Finally, having mentioned the multiverse, we should note that the increasingly 287
influential ‘many worlds’ interpretation of quantum mechanics is inextricably linked 288
with information concepts (Byrne 2010; Saunders et al. 2010; Wallace 2012). 289
‘Information’, in the physical realm is invariably defined in an objective, 290
meaning-free way. However, there has been a realisation that information content, as 291
assessed by any of the formalisms, with randomness giving the highest information 292
content by Shannon’s measure, is not an intuitively sensible measure. Interest has 293
focused on ideas of complexity, and on the idea that it is from an interaction of 294
order and randomness that complex systems, embodying ‘interesting’ information, 295
emerge. This has led to alternative measures of complexity and order (Lloyd 2001, 296
2006; Gell-Mann and Lloyd 1998). Examples, with very informal explanations are: 297
algorithmic information content (related to the length of the shortest algorithm 298
which recreates the state; ordered systems need only short algorithms); logical 299
depth (related to the running time of the simplest algorithm which recreates the 300
state); and thermodynamic depth (related to the number of possible ways that a 301
system may arrive at its present state; ‘deep’ systems are hard to create). These 302
offer the promise of quantifying physical information in ways which, by contrast 303
with the Shannon formalism, account for emergent properties, and to ‘interesting’ 304
informational structures, of potential relevance to biological and social domains, 305
as well as providing powerful tools for explaining the physical world; for popular 306
accounts see Gell-Mann (1995) and Barrow (2007). 307
At about the same time, in the 1940s, as the groundwork for an information 308
perspective on the physical sciences was being developed, the same was happening 309
in biology, and it is to that domain we now turn. 310
6.2.3 Information Biology 311
In biology, the discovery of the genetic code and the statement of the so-called 312
‘central dogma’ of molecular biology – that information flows from DNA to 313
proteins – have led to the ideas that information is a fundamental biological property, 314
and that the ability to process information may be a characteristic of living things 315
as fundamental as, or more fundamental than, metabolism, reproduction, and other 316
signifiers of life. Dartnell (2007) describes this as the Darwinian definition: life as 317
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6 Mind the Gap: Transitions Between Concepts of Information in Varied Domains
information transmission. For this reason, it is sometimes stated that biology is now 318
an information science; see, for example, Baltimore (2002), Maynard Smith (2010), 319
and Terzis and Arp (2011). 320
Concepts of information in the biology domain are varied, and we make no 321
attempt to summarise a complex area. Information may manifest in many contexts: 322
the transmission of genetic information through the DNA code, the transmission of 323
neural information, and the many and varied forms of communication and signalling 324
between living things being just three examples. One vexed, and undecided, 325
question is at what stage ‘meaning’ can be said to appear; some authors argue 326
that it is sensible to speak of the meaning of a segment of DNA, while others 327
allege that meaning is an accompaniment of consciousness. And there are those 328
who suggest that consciousness itself is explicable in information terms; see, for 329
instance, Tonioni’s (2008) ideas of consciousness as integrated information. 330
The analysis of living systems in information terms has been typically associated 331
with a reductionist approach, with enthusiastic adoption of Shannon’s ‘meaning- 332
free’ formulae to assess the information content of living things; see, for example 333
Gatlin (1972). An idea similar to Wiener’s conception of information as an opposite 334
of entropy had been proposed at an early stage by the German physicist Erwin 335
Schro¨dinger (1944), one of the pioneers of quantum mechanics, who had suggested 336
that living organisms fed upon such negative entropy. Later, the idea of information 337
as the opposite of entropy was popularised, under the name of ‘negentropy’, by 338
Brillouin (1962), and was adopted by researchers in several areas of biology, 339
including ecology; for examples, see Patten (1961), Kier (1980), and Jaffe (1984). 340
However, such approaches, with their generally reductionist overtones, have not 341
been particularly fruitful, leading some biologists to favour an approach focusing 342
more on the emergence of complexity and, in various senses, meaning; see, for 343
example, Hazen, Griffin, Carothers and Szostak (2007). Several authors have 344
considered the ways in which information may both influence and be influenced 345
by evolutionary processes relating this to the evolution of exosomatic meaningful 346
information in the human realm; see, for example, Goonatilake (1994), MaddenAQ1 347
(2004), Auletta (2011), and Reading (2011). 348
Meaningful information, though not yet accepted as a central concept in biology, 349
is certainly so in the realm of human, social, communicable information, to which 350
we now turn. 351
6.2.4 Social Information 352
The social, or human, conception of information is, of course, prominent in 353
library/information science. As such, it is likely to be most familiar to this book’s 354
readers, and, accordingly, this section is relatively short. But information is also 355
a significant concept in other human-centred disciplines, including psychology, 356
semiotics, communication studies, and sociology. While the exact conceptions, and 357
to a degree the terminology differ, all take a subjective and context-dependent 358
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view of information; one which is associated with knowledge and meaning. 359
Information is regarded as something which is always and inevitably associated 360
with human beings being informed about, and therefore knowing, something, and 361
that information having a meaning to them. There are, of course, a variety of ways 362
in which human-centred information may be conceptualised; some of these are 363
discussed later in this chapter. 364
There have been attempts to bridge the gap between this conception of infor- 365
mation and the scientific and technical perspective. A variety of means have been 366
adopted to try to extend the kind of information theory pioneered by Shannon 367
and by Wiener to deal with meaningful semantic information, and to develop 368
mathematical models for information flow: see Dretske (1981) and Barwise and 369
Seligman (1997) as examples, and see Cornelius (2002) and Floridi (2011a) for 370
reviews. Some authors, such as Qvortrup (1993), have argued that the information 371
theory formalisms in themselves are not as objective, external, and impersonal as 372
suggested, but this view has not been generally accepted. 373
The ‘negentropy’ concept has been applied, some would argue unwisely, to 374
such areas as economics, sociology, psychology and theology. Mu¨ller (2007, 73), 375
a scientist in the field of chemical thermodynamics, warns against “a lack of 376
intellectual thoroughness in such extrapolations. Each one ought to be examined 377
properly for mere shallow analogies”. The same is surely true for applications in the 378
library/information sciences. 379
Finally, in this brief survey of information concepts in different domains, we 380
consider philosophy. Although the sub-discipline of epistemology has studied the 381
nature of knowledge for many centuries, information per se has not until recently 382
been of major concern to philosophers. 383
6.2.5 Philosophy of Information 384
Before Luciano Floridi proposed his ‘philosophy of information’ in the late 1990s 385
(as he recounts in Floridi 2010b), relatively few philosophers took any interest in in- 386
formation, at least in a way likely to be of value for library/information science; see 387
Furner (2010) for an insightful overview. Knowledge, of course, is another matter; 388
that has been studied for many centuries, as the subject matter of epistemology. The 389
usual view in that context is that knowledge is to be understood as ‘justified, true 390
belief’; that is to say, for something to count as knowledge, it must be believed by 391
someone, for rational reasons, and it must be true. Information fits into epistemology 392
in the form of testimony. This is a kind of evidence in which philosophers are 393
becoming increasingly interested; see, for example, Audi (1997) and Adler (2010). 394
Apart from this, there have been a number of developments in philosophical 395
thought which provide ways of viewing the relations between information and 396
knowledge which offer different insights to the Popperian Three Worlds ‘objective 397
knowledge’ model and the data-information-knowledge hierarchy, both of which 398
have already been mentioned. One is the work of philosophers such as Dretske 399
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(1981), who have attempted to extend Shannon theory into the area of semantic 400
information. Another, and certainly the most ambitious to date, is that within 401
Floridi’s ‘philosophy of information’, which will be discussed in detail later. We 402
may also mention three other interesting ideas: David Deutsch’s (2011) concept of 403
‘explanatory knowledge’, which comprises our best rational explanations for the 404
way the world is, with the understanding that such knowledge is inevitably fallible 405
and imperfect, and our task is to improve it, not to justify it; Jonathan Kvanvig’s 406
(2003) idea of knowledge as ‘understanding’, which allows for contradictions 407
and inconsistencies; and Michael Polanyi’s (1962) ideas of ‘personal knowledge’ 408
(somewhat similar to Popper’s World 2), which have been further developed within 409
the context of library/information science; see, for example, Day (2005). 410
This concludes our cursory examination of information in different domains, and 411
we now move to look specifically at the gaps between them. 412
6.3 Identifying the Gaps 413
We have noted the various ways in which the information concept can be used in 414
five domains, and some of the attempts made to transfer concepts and formalisms 415
between domains. We could add others, not least library/information science, but 416
five is more than sufficient. 417
In principle, we could seek to describe the gap between the information concept 418
between each pair of domains, but a simpler and more sensible alternative is to 419
hand. Consideration of the ways in which information is understood in the various 420
domains leads us to two alternatives, both of which have been espoused in the 421
literature. 422
The first is to consider a binary divide, between those domains in which 423
information is treated as something objective, quantitative, and mainly associated 424
with data, and those in which it is treated as subjective, qualitative, and mainly 425
associated with knowledge, meaning, and understanding. The former include 426
physics and technology; the latter include the social realm. The biological treatment 427
of information is ambiguous, lying somewhere between the two, though tending to 428
the former the more information-centred the biological approach is, especially in the 429
more reductive areas of genetics, genomics, and bioinformatics. The philosophical 430
treatment depends on the philosopher; as we have seen, different philosophers and 431
schools of philosophy take radically different views of the concept of information. 432
The second alternative is slightly more complex, and envisages a three-way 433
demarcation, with the biological treatment of information occupying a distinct 434
position between the other two extremes, physical and social. 435
Whichever of these alternatives is preferred, the basic question is the same: 436
to what extent, if at all, are objective, quantitative, and ‘meaning-free’ notions 437
of information ‘the same as’, emergent into, or at least in some way related to, 438
subjective, qualitative, and ‘meaningful’ notions. This, we suggest, is in essence the 439
same question as Wheeler framed when he asked ‘What makes meaning?’. 440
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6.4 Bridging the Gaps 441
There have been a number of contributions to the literature suggesting, in general 442
terms, that ‘gap bridging’ may be feasible and desirable, without giving any very 443
definite suggestions as to how this may be done. One of the authors of this chapter 444
has put forward a proposal of this vague nature, suggesting that information in 445
human, biological, and physical realms is related through emergent properties in 446
complex systems (Bawden 2007a, b). In this view, physical information is associated 447
with pattern, biological information with meaning, and social information with 448
understanding. 449
In an influential paper from (1991), Buckland distinguished three uses of the term 450
‘information’: 451
• Information-as-thing, where the information is associated with a document; 452
• Information-as-process, where the information is that which changes a person’s 453
knowledge state; 454
• Information-as-knowledge, where the information is equated with the knowledge 455
which it imparts. 456
From the information-as-thing viewpoint, information is regarded as physical 457
and objective, or at least as being ‘contained within’ physical documents and 458
essentially equivalent to them. The other two meanings treat information as 459
abstract and intangible. Buckland gives arguments in favour of the information- 460
as-thing approach, as being very directly relevant to information science, since 461
it deals primarily with information in the form of documents. Information-as- 462
process underlies theories of information behaviour which have a focus on the 463
experience of individuals, such as those of Dervin and Kuhlthau (Bawden and 464
Robinson 2012). Information-as-knowledge invokes the idea, well-trodden in the 465
library/information area, as noted above, that information and knowledge are closely 466
related. The exact relation, however, is not an obvious one. How is knowledge to be 467
understood here? As a ‘refined’, summarised, and evaluated form of information?; 468
as a structured and contextualised form of information?; or information embedded 469
within an individual’s knowledge structure? These, and other, ideas all have their 470
supporters. 471
We will now look at three approaches to this kind of gap bridging which offer 472
more concrete proposals: those of Tom Stonier, Marcia Bates, and Luciano Floridi. 473
Stonier, in a series of three books, advanced a model of information as an abstract 474
force promoting organisation in systems of all kinds: physical, biological, mental, 475
and social, including recorded information (Stonier 1990, 1992, 1997). This is a 476
model envisaging the bridging of two distinct gaps, in the terms discussed above. 477
Stonier regards information, in its most fundamental form, as a physical entity 478
analogous to energy; whereas energy, in his view, is defined as the capacity to 479
perform work, information is the capacity to organise a system, or to maintain it in 480
a state of organisation. He regards a high-information state as one that is organised 481
and of low physical entropy. This, he points out is the opposite of Shannon’s relation 482
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between information and entropy, which Stonier regards as an unfortunate metaphor. 483
He links this concept of information to biological and human information, or as 484
he prefers intelligence, and to meaning, through an evolutionary process. Salthe 485
(2011) presents a somewhat similar viewpoint linking thermodynamic entropy and 486
Shannon information through to meaning and semiotics. 487
Bates, has advanced a similar all-encompassing model, which she characterises 488
as ‘evolutionary’ (Bates 2005, 2006). It relies on identifying and interrelating a 489
number of ‘information-like’ entities: 490
• Information 1 – the pattern of organization of matter and energy 491
• Information 2 – some pattern of organization of matter and energy given meaning 492
by a living being 493
• Data 1 – that portion of the entire information environment available to a sensing 494
organism that is taken in, or processed, by that organism 495
• Data 2 – information selected or generated by human beings for social purposes 496
• Knowledge – information given meaning and integrated with other contents of 497
understanding 498
This model, while all-encompassing and one of the more ambitious attempts at 499
integrating information in all its contexts, remains at a conceptual and qualitative 500
level, and introduces a potentially confusing multiplicity of forms of information 501
and similar entities. In particular, the distinction between Information 1 and 502
Information 2, without any clear indication of their relation, seems to perpetuate 503
a gap, rather than bridge one. Bates describes her approach as evolutionary, and 504
relates it to the approaches of Goonatilake (1991) and Madden (2004), mentioned 505
earlier, though these latter start with information in the biological realm, rather than 506
the, arguably more basic, physical world. She argues that the different forms of 507
information are emergent, as animals – not just humans – can recognise patterns 508
of physical information in their environment. Animals can assign meaning to such 509
recognition, though not in a conscious act of labelling; this is reserved for the human 510
realm. In contrast to Stonier, she argues that information is the order in the system, 511
rather than its capacity to create order (both of which, we may remind ourselves, are 512
the opposite of the Shannon conception). For Bates, knowing the degree of order of 513
a system tells us how much information it contains; for Stonier, knowing how much 514
information is in it tells us how it may be ordered. 515
Floridi (2010a, 2011b) has presented a General Definition of Information (GDI) 516
as part of his Philosophy of Information, analysing the ways in which information 517
may be understood, and opting to regard it from the semantic viewpoint, as “well- 518
formed, meaningful and truthful data”. Data is understood here as simply a lack 519
of uniformity; a noticeable difference or distinction in something. To count as 520
information, individual data elements must be compiled into a collection which must 521
be well-formed (put together correctly according to relevant syntax), meaningful 522
(complying with relevant semantics), and truthful; the latter requires a detailed 523
analysis of the nature of true information, as distinct from misinformation, pseudo- 524
information and false information. Although Floridi takes account of Shannon’s 525
formalism in the development of his conception of information, and argues that it 526
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“provides the necessary ground to understand other kinds of information” (Floridi 527
2010a, 78), he moves beyond it in discussing human, semantic information. His 528
analysis also includes biological information in detail; noting that it is complex 529
and multifaceted, he treats, for example, genetic and neural information separately. 530
Meaningful information and knowledge are part of the same conceptual family. 531
Information is converted to knowledge by being inter-related, a process that may 532
be expressed through network theory. Informally, “what [knowledge] enjoys and 533
[information] lacks : : : is the web of mutual relations that allow one part of it 534
to account for another. Shatter that, and you are left with a pile of truths or a 535
random list of bits of information that cannot help to make sense of the reality 536
that they seek to address” (Floridi 2011b, 288). Furthermore, information that is 537
meaningful must also be relevant in order to qualify as knowledge, and this aspect 538
may be formally modelled, as also the distinction between ‘knowing’, ‘believing’, 539
and ‘being informed’. 540
This is therefore a formalism – the only one of its kind thus far – which 541
begins with a treatment of information in Shannon’s objective sense, and goes on, 542
apparently seamlessly, to include subjectivity, meaning, and relevance. It provides 543
a formal framework for understanding a variety of forms of information, and, while 544
in itself an exercise in philosophical analysis, it may serve as a basis for other forms 545
of consideration of information in various domains. It also, happily, includes and 546
systematises library/information science’s pragmatic approaches to the information- 547
knowledge relation, discussed earlier. 548
While undoubtedly valuable as a framework for understanding, Floridi’s concep- 549
tualisation does not of itself answer our basic question: which, if any, conceptions, 550
and laws and principles, of information in one domain can be meaningfully applied 551
in another? We will go on to consider this, but first we must ask: why bother? 552
6.5 Why Attempt to Bridge the Gaps? 553
The question then inevitably arises as to whether these various ideas of information 554
have any relevance for the library/information sciences, whether it just happens that 555
the English word ‘information’ is used to mean quite different things in different 556
contexts, or whether any connections which there may be are so vague and limited 557
as to be of little interest or value. 558
We believe that this is a question well worth investigating, and not just for the 559
sake of having a neat and all-encompassing framework. If the gaps between different 560
understandings of information can be bridged in some way, then there is a possibility 561
for helpful interactions and synergies between the different conceptualisations. 562
In particular, if it is correct that the principles of physics and of biology can 563
be, to a significant extent, cast in information terms, then there should be the 564
possibility, at the least, for analogies helpful to human-centred disciplines, including 565
library/information science to be identified. This need not be in any sense a 566
reductionist enterprise, attempting to ‘explain away’ social and human factors in 567
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physical and biological terms. Nor need it be just one way. If it is true, as some 568
authors suggest, that there are some general principles, involving information, 569
complexity, meaning, and similar entities and concepts, which operate very widely, 570
beyond the scope of individual disciplines, then it is not beyond the bounds of 571
possibility that insights from the library/information sciences could ‘feed back’ 572
to inform physical and biological conceptions. No such examples have yet been 573
reported, though one might envisages them coming from areas such as infometrics, 574
information behaviour, and information organisation. This kind of feedback is, of 575
course, in the opposite direction to the common reductive approach, by which 576
physics informs chemistry, which informs biology, which in turn informs the social 577
sciences. If it ever proved fruitful, it would have the potential to change the standing 578
of the library/information sciences within the academic spectrum, giving it a place 579
as a more fundamental discipline. 580
Let us, at the risk of seriously annoying those readers who will think this 581
approach too naı¨ve to be worth dignifying in print, give some examples of physical 582
laws which could have ‘information analogies’ for a popular account of these laws, 583
see Pickover (2008). 584
To begin with perhaps the simplest possible example, Ohm’s law states that 585
the strength of an electric current, I, is proportional to the applied voltage, V, and 586
inversely proportional to the resistance, R, of the material carrying the current; in 587
appropriate units, I D V=R. We can easily envisage an information analogy, with 588
information flow equating to current, the strength of the need for information equat- 589
ing to voltage, and a measure of difficulty of obtaining the necessary information 590
equating to resistance. So, if we consider the situation of a doctor treating a seriously 591
ill patient, and needing to know the appropriate drug treatment, we have a high value 592
of V. If the doctor has in their pocket a mobile device giving immediate access to 593
well-structure drug information, then we might say that R was low. 594
Too simple? How about Poiseille’s Law, which governs the rate of flow, Q, of a 595
fluid with viscosity " through a pipe of length L and internal radius r, when there is 596
a pressure difference P. The formula, assuming that the flow is smooth, without any 597
turbulence, and that the density of the fluid never changes, is Q D  r4$P=8 "L. 598
Again, we may amuse ourselves looking for information equivalents: the length of 599
the pipe equates to the number of steps in a communication chain; its internal radius 600
equates the amount of information which can be transferred; the viscosity equates 601
to the difficulty in understanding the information; and so on. This is not such an odd 602
idea: Qvortrup (1993) reminds us that Shannon’s theories are firmly based on the 603
metaphor of information as water flowing through a pipe. 604
Another example is the use of the various scientific diffusion laws, which offer 605
clear analogies with information dissemination. Avramescu (1980) gave an early 606
example of this, using laws for the diffusion of heat in solids, equating temperature 607
to the extent of interest in the information; Liu and Rousseau (2012) review 608
this and other examples. Le Coadic (1987) mentions this, and similar attempts 609
to use diffusion and transfer models drawn for both the physical and biological 610
sciences, while cautioning against the uncritical use of such analogies. However, 611
provided they are treated with due caution, such analogies with physical laws, 612
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even if it be accepted that there is no underlying common ‘meta-law’, may be of 613
value as aids to teaching and learning, and to the early stages of the planning of 614
research. 615
We must also mention quantum mechanics, the most fundamental scientific 616
advance of the last century, of which both the mathematical formalism (directly) and 617
concepts (by analogy) have been applied in a library/information science context; 618
see, for example, Piwowarski et al. (2010, 2012), and Budd (2012). 619
It may be objected that this is too simplistic an approach. Physical laws are 620
physical laws, and are too specific to their context to be adapted for human 621
information, and do not take account of its dynamic nature, nor of the ability of 622
humans to be more than passive recipients. 623
What, then, about a more general principle? In the physical sciences, the principle 624
of least action occupies a central place, as does Zipf’s principle of least effort in the 625
social, including library/information, sciences. Is it unreasonable to ask if there may 626
be a reason for this, which would involve some common aspects of information in 627
the two realms? 628
Or perhaps we should look rather at statistical regularities, whether these be 629
called laws or not, and consider whether there may be some underlying reasons, 630
if similar regularities are found in different realms. One example may be the fractal, 631
or self-similar, nature of many physical systems, which, it is hypothesised, may also 632
be found in technical and social information; see, for example, Ottaviani (1994) and 633
Berners-Lee and Kagal (2008). Similarly the power law relationships underlying 634
the main bibliometric laws (Egghe 2005) have their equivalents in power laws in the 635
physical and biological sciences. 636
The important question is not which of these ideas or approaches is ‘right’. It 637
is simply whether it is rational and appropriate to look at ideas of information 638
in different domains, seeking for causal links, emergent properties, analogies, or 639
perhaps just helpful metaphors. It is by no means certain that this is so. We 640
have seen that some scientists, such as Mu¨ller, object to the use of information 641
concepts in thermodynamics. And, conversely, many in the library/information 642
sciences are concerned about the application of the term ‘information’ to objective, 643
meaningless patterns. Le Coadic (1987), Cole (1994), Hjørland (2007, 2008), and 644
Ma (2012), for example, argue in various ways against any equating of the idea 645
of information as an objective and measurable ‘thing’ to the kind of information 646
of interest in library and information science; this kind of information, such 647
commentators argue, is subjective in nature, having meaning for a person in a 648
particular context, and cannot be reduced to a single objective, still less quantifiable, 649
definition. However, this perhaps overlooks some recent trends in the physical and 650
biological sciences themselves: not merely the increased focus on information noted 651
above, but a tendency towards conceptualisations involving non-linearity, systems 652
thinking, complexity, and reflexivity. All these tend to make current scientific 653
thinking a more amenable source of analogy for the library/information sciences, 654
than heretofore. 655
It may also be objected that the physical, and to a degree the biological, sciences 656
are necessarily mathematical in nature, whereas the library/information sciences 657
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are largely qualitative. While qualitative analysis is certainly necessary, and indeed 658
arguably the best way of achieving understanding in this field (Bawden 2012), this 659
is no reason not to seek for mathematical formalisms to increase and deepen such 660
understanding. Over 30 years ago, Brookes (1980) argued that information science 661
needed a different kind of mathematics; perhaps the library/information sciences 662
still do. 663
Our view is that the questions are so intriguing that it is worth the attempt to 664
bridge these gaps. And we believe that the valuable insights already gained from the 665
kinds of approaches discussed above justifies this position. Wheeler’s Big Questions 666
have not been answered yet, and it may be that studies of the relation between 667
information as understood in the library/information sciences, and as understood 668
in other domains, may contribute to their solution. 669
6.6 Conclusions 670
We are faced with two kinds of gaps: the gaps between the concepts of information 671
in different domains; and the gap between those who believe that it is worth trying 672
to bridge such gaps and those who believe that such attempts are, for the most part 673
at least, doomed to fail. 674
The authors of this chapter consider themselves in the first group. But we wish 675
to be realistic about what can be attempted: as Jonathan Furner (2010, 174) puts it, 676
“the outlook for those who would hold out for a ‘one size fits all’ transdisciplinary 677
definition of information is not promising”. We should not look for, nor expect to 678
find, direct and simplistic equivalences; rather we can hope to uncover more subtle 679
linkages, perhaps to be found through the use of concepts such as complexity and 680
emergence. 681
We would also do well to note Bates’ (2005) reminder that there are swings 682
of fashion in this area, as in many other academic areas. The recent favouring 683
of subjective and qualitative conceptions of information is perhaps a reaction to 684
the strong objectivity of information science in preceding decades, which was 685
itself a reaction to the perceived limitations of traditional subjectivist methods of 686
library/information science (Bates 2005). Perhaps the time has come for something 687
of a swing back, to allow a merging of views, and a place for different viewpoints 688
in a holistic framework. A bridging of gaps, in fact. A number of authors have 689
advocated this, though so far it has not happened. 690
At a time when other disciplines, particularly in the physical and biological 691
sciences, are embracing information as a vital concept, it seems unwise for the 692
library/information sciences to ignore potentially valuable insights, though we 693
certainly wish to avoid the shallow analogies mentioned above. 694
Mind the gaps, certainly, but be aware of the insights that may be found within 695
them. 696
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